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ABSTRACT
The paradigm of pretrained deep learning models has re-
cently emerged in artificial intelligence practice, allowing
deployment in numerous societal settings with limited com-
putational resources, but also embedding biases and enabling
unintended negative uses. In this paper, we treat pretrained
models as objects of study and discuss the ethical impacts
of their sociological position. We discuss how pretrained
models are developed and compared under the common task
framework, but that this may make self-regulation inade-
quate. Further how pretrained models may have a performa-
tive effect on society that exacerbates biases. We then discuss
how pretrained models move through actor networks as a
kind of computationally immutable mobile, but that users
also act as agents of technological change by reinterpreting
them via fine-tuning and transfer. We further discuss how
users may use pretrained models in malicious ways, draw-
ing a novel connection between the responsible innovation
and user-centered innovation literatures. We close by dis-
cussing how this sociological understanding of pretrained
models can inform AI governance frameworks for fairness,
accountability, and transparency.
1 INTRODUCTION
Large-scale deep learning models with billions of param-
eters can now perform a variety of natural language and
vision tasks at or above human levels, but require signif-
icant computational—and therefore energetic/monetary—
resources to train. As such, the development of these models
has largely been carried out by artificial intelligence (AI)
researchers in large institutions (especially for-profit com-
panies) [79], and is out of reach for researchers in smaller
institutions/academia and other technically-skilled AI enthu-
siasts. For brevity, we will sometimes refer to these social
groups as producers and lead users, following the user-based
innovation [92] and social construction of technology (SCOT)
[42] literatures.
The development and release of pretrained deep learning
models by producers has recently emerged as a standard
paradigm in AI practice, allowing lead users to then fine-
tune and transfer them for use in a variety of research and
societal settings. In natural language processing, examples
of pretrained models include BERT [21], GPT-2 [76], ELMo
[73], and XLnet [96]. Beyond the models themselves, pro-
ducers may or may not also release the training dataset, the
code implementing the learning rule, or descriptions of the
computational infrastructure; this provides varying levels
of transparency. Unfortunately, as we detail in the sequel,
pretrained models may embed biases in unknown and im-
mutable ways while also enabling unintended negative uses.
In this paper, we treat pretrained models as objects of
study and discuss the impact their sociological position has
on fairness, accountability, and transparency in the larger so-
ciotechnical systems in which they are embedded. We draw
on analytical frameworks from science and technology stud-
ies (STS). Without taking a strong normative position, we
especially focus on implications for AI governance processes.
Whether considering nuclear reactions, recombinant DNA
technology, or mutant flu strains, much scientific research
and innovation can benefit the public but also be diverted
to harmful uses. A typical reaction by scientists performing
such dual-use research has been self-regulation and self-
imposed moratoriums, yet careful historical study demon-
strates the inadequacy of this. As Kaiser and Moreno argue,
“no matter the field of research, can anyone be expected to
step outside the excitement and momentum of their own
work to make objective decisions in risky situations?” [37].
Here we suggest such momentum may be even stronger
when entire research fields are oriented around a quest to
achieve a singular objective—Holy Grail performativity [89]
in Austin’s sense of concepts being performed in practice
[5, 57]. The ascendancy of the so-called common task frame-
work in AI [23] embodies exactly such performativity, yet
the dual-use potential of pretrained models has led to recent
attempts at self-imposed limits on open release [30, 75]. The
growing responsible innovation literature within science and
technology studies [86] has been discussed in relation to AI
by Brundage [10, 12], but these self-regulation actions are
seemingly not informed by understanding the position of
pretrainedmodels that emerges from treating them as objects
of sociological study, cf. [11]. We will discuss how insights
from responsible innovation and broader STS discourse may
inform AI governance policies.
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The responsible innovation literature has, as far as we can
tell [40], remained unconcerned with user-driven innovation
[92] and users as agents of technological change [42, 71].
Yet, user innovation is of central importance in AI, where
innovation comes not just from producers of pretrained mod-
els but also lead users of pretrained models that fine-tune
and transfer them to applications outside the control (and
often outside the imagination) of the producers.1 When pre-
trained models are at the consumption junction (in the sense
of Cowan [19]), they may be reinterpreted in malicious ways.
Taking the case of AI, we will discuss how principles of gov-
ernance from responsible innovation should be extended to
consider the role of users as innovators. Of particular rel-
evance for this extension is to understand how pretrained
models are developed and evolve as they move among actors
in the two social groups.
Von Hippel and colleagues have noted a kind of division
of labor in types of innovations pursued by producers and
users for scientific instruments [77] and whitewater kayak-
ing [31]. Producers pursue innovations of interest to the
entire market, typically along a fixed dimension of merit
such as faster, cheaper, or more reliable. Contrarily, users
pursue innovations to do functionally new things without
strong concern for the fraction of the market that may be
interested, since they are self-rewarded through intrinsic
motivations [6, 92]. A similar division is seen in AI where an
initial general-purpose model like BERT [21] is developed
by an industrial research lab (and improved by another in-
dustrial research lab as RoBERTa [54]) whereas academic
researchers fine-tune/transfer such a model to have other
more specific functionality such as BioBERT [50] (for med-
ical text mining), ViLBERT [56] (for vision-and-language
tasks), and BERTserini [95] (for question-answering).
Although pretrained models are not diagrams or inscrip-
tions having the possibility of optical consistency in the sense
of Latour [47], they do move around among actors in the AI
community and are a kind of computationally immutable mo-
bile where the immutability stems from the computational
costs in modification. Despite the consistency of pretrained
models—at the level of individual bits—as they move, they
remain interpretively flexible for users. Since these models
are largely obtained anonymously from open source repos-
itories rather than from personal instructional interaction
(like Feynman diagrams [36]), further interpretive flexibility
is maintained. In fact it is this plasticity of pretrained models
in the hands of users—who can fine-tune them for transfer to
alternative tasks—that has given them their staying power.
1Note that in this paper, we do not consider the final consumers of AI
inferences, which are another social group altogether.
Moving from responsible innovation considerations due to
intentional malicious use by users, we also consider uninten-
tional ethical issues such as algorithmic unfairness that may
be immutably embedded in pretrained models. Since these
models are often abstracted by users as essentially black
boxes with general intelligence ability that can be fine-tuned
to transfer to any task, the biases in models and their training
data are not considered [80]. Moreover, due to computational
immutability, these biases are fixed. More troublingly, as we
detail later, the descriptions of the world (including societal
biases) embedded in pretrained models have Barnesian per-
formativity [7, 57], in the sense they may act to shape the
future evolution of the world. That is, as noted in classical
economic theories of discrimination [4, 17, 84] and recent
models of model retraining [22, 33, 67], populations might
becomemore like what (biased) models predict. In fact, biases
may even be amplified through the fine-tuning and transfer
carried out by lead users [97] in a single stage of evolution.
We will further discuss how this understanding of unfairness
propagation can inform AI governance.
To summarize, we revisit responsible innovation in the
context of AI fairness, accountability, and transparency by
characterizing the social position of pretrained models:
• Holy Grail performativity in model development due
to the common task framework,
• Users as innovators and agents of technological change
through fine-tuning and transfer,
• Computational immutability but interpretive flexibility
of pretrained models as they move among actors, and
• Barnesian performativity of pretrainedmodels in terms
of the evolution of algorithmic fairness.
2 SELF-REGULATION AND THE HOLY GRAIL OF
PRETRAINED MODEL DEVELOPMENT
In February 2019, OpenAI developed a large-scale unsuper-
vised language model called GPT-2 (Generative Pretrained
Transformer 2) to generate several coherent sentences of
realistic text by extending any given seed. This model fur-
ther simultaneously performs well on a variety of language
tasks including question answering, reading comprehension,
summarization, and translation [76]. We should further note
that in general, better pretrained models lead to better per-
formance on fine-tuned or transfer tasks [44, 58].
Contrary to recent practice in the artificial intelligence
community, OpenAI did not release the training data or the
learned parameters of their largest neural network model,
only smaller ones. This, due to concerns that large language
models may be used to generate deceptive, biased, or abusive
language at scale. In describing their decision to limit the
transparency of the GPT-2 model, the producers described
several positive and negative uses, which we quote here [75]:
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[+] AI writing assistants, more capable dia-
logue agents, unsupervised translation be-
tween languages, and better speech recog-
nition systems
[–] Generate misleading news articles, im-
personate others online, automate the pro-
duction of abusive or faked content to post
on social media, automate the production
of spam/phishing content
As seen, the producers themselves did not specify too many
functionally novel uses. Yet, lead users quickly transferred
the model to multifarious settings; a positive example using
a smaller version of GPT-2 that OpenAI did release, Deep
TabNine is a software programming productivity tool2 to pre-
dict the next chunk of code, fine-tuned on open source files
from GitHub capturing numerous programming languages.
Notwithstanding numerous arguments against GPT-2 ac-
tually posing a societal threat [30], the self-regulation prac-
ticed by OpenAI is rather limited. It is not a self-moratorium
but only a limitation on distributing detailed results (the
pretrained model itself). Indeed, a student with significant
computational resources provided by Google [48] purport-
edly reproduced OpenAI’s GPT-2 model, though he also did
not release his model for verification [49] citing similar con-
cerns of malicious uses, especially with respect to setting
social norms for future release of dual-use AI technology.
As noted in Section 1, several cases in the history of science
have shown that self-moratoriums are ineffective, to say
nothing of limited self-regulation that does not militate the
pursuit of technological progress and may even encourage
it. After all, knowing that something can be done is often a
greater spur for future innovation than a detailed description
of how it was done.
In the next subsections, we describe certain social norms
among producers of pretrained models and then discuss why
these norms render self-regulation inadequate.
Pursuing Holy Grails
In building engineering systems—whether physical systems
like engines or informational ones like AI—benchmarking
performance to understand how well one is doing is often
cast as important. To do so, scientists try to both establish
clear metrics of performance (oftenmeasured in standardized
units) and have useful points of comparison. In this vein,
the Scottish engineer James Watt developed the concept of
horsepower to benchmark the output of steam engines by
comparing to the power of draft horses. Indeed, comparing
performance of new technologies with either humans or
animals that have similar abilities is a typical strategy.
2https://tabnine.com/blog/deep
Figure 1: The GLUE leaderboard for general performance on
natural language tasks (14 Aug. 2019) [94]. Notice the graded
performance on a single dimension, comparing to human
performance (#4).
In AI, the Turing test has been proposed as a way to mea-
sure a machine’s ability to exhibit intelligent behavior by
making a binary comparison to people. A machine is said
to be intelligent if it exhibits behavior equivalent to, or in-
distinguishable from, that of a human. This is to be tested
through a conversation with human judges [88]. There are
well-known limitations of the Turing test in terms of gam-
ing, cheating, and operational difficulty. It is also largely
focused on language ability at the neglect of other facets of
intelligence such as perception or creativity. As such, several
alternatives have recently been proposed [59].
One basic property of these new test proposals is scor-
ing intelligence in a graded manner, rather than just all-or-
nothing, cf. [1, 16]. This provides a refined characterization
of system performance on a quantitative scale. Yet, these
approaches still essentially use human performance as a
benchmark for comparison, even though there is much vari-
ation in human intelligence not only within populations but
even across the historical record [68] (and may therefore
not be absolute milestones, contrary to [83]). A typical AI
leaderboard oriented as the pursuit of human performance
is shown in Figure 1, here measuring performance with stan-
dard evaluation data (an idea we will return to).
An alternative to judging performance relative to animals
or humans is to establish fundamental theoretical limits.
Whether considering the Carnot limit on the efficiency of en-
gines [15] or the Shannon limit on reliable communication in
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the presence of noise [82], engineering systems theories es-
tablishwhat is possible andwhat is impossible. The boundary
between the two is what is optimal. Thus, such limit theo-
rems provide absolute standards by which performance may
be measured. If a communication scheme operates within
0.0045 dB of the Shannon limit, this is nearly as good as can
be and is independent of how efficiently human communica-
tion operates in noise. Once an absolute scale anchored on
fundamental limits is established, human performance can
also be fixed as a statistical distribution on that spectrum.3
There are several AI settings for which non-constructive
fundamental limits are known: by non-constructive we mean
that although the limits can be computed, strategies that ac-
tually achieve those limits are not known. Examples include
flying without crashing [38], combinatorial creativity [91],
communicating with aliens [65], and reconstructing the tree
of life [85]. In data-driven areas of AI, however, it is often
not possible to define fully closed deductive systems [69] in
which to reason about fundamental limits (even if in princi-
ple, Bayes risk is a fundamental limit). To emulate the kind
of abstraction achieved in closed deductive systems, the com-
mon task framework has emerged as a prevailing paradigm
for AI model development [23]. The idea is to pursue best
task performance on a fixed dataset, split into training and
testing portions. Figure 1 shows the common task framework
in action where the standardized GLUE dataset [94] is used
to assess performance of different AI models on a standard
task set. As seen, producers aim to develop AI models that
perform better than humans and each other, and the top
results are common pretrained models such as RoBERTa and
XLNet.
Moreover, because ideals are data- and task-specific, there
can be a progression of goals within the common task frame-
work, different than information-theoretic or thermodynamic
limits which are fixed by the closed deductive system. For
example, the header of Figure 1 indicates that SuperGLUE
has been developed as a successor to GLUE.
Inadequacy of Self-Governance
Drawing on the historical case of coding theory being or-
ganized as a quest to achieve information-theoretic limits,
Varshney had argued that closed universes of deductive dis-
course and fundamental limits within them lead to Holy
3There are some settings where animals perform intelligent behavior nearly
at the fundamental limits [2]. Examples include great tits (Parus major)
nearly achieving optimal performance in feeding strategy, as described by
two-armed bandit exploration/exploitation tradeoffs; moose (Alces alces)
essentially achieving the optimal diet in a Michigan national park, as given
by the solution of a linear program; and lions (Panthera leo) having hunting
behavior over time that matches the solution to a dynamic programming
optimization. In all examples, performance of particular behavioral strate-
gies taken by given organisms has been compared to the best performance
possible by any strategy.
Grail performativity [89]. That is, introducing the concept
of a limiting ideal is performative: the use in practice of a
theoretical concept orients research and innovation more
towards that theoretical concept.
As Pierce described [74], again about coding as a quest
to achieve information-theoretic limits, “it may be true that
communications theorists could have devised error-correcting
schemes even if they never knew of the limit theorems of in-
formation theory, but it is doubtful that theywould have tried
so hard and so well without limit theorems with which to
compare their results (and occasionally to goad themselves).”
This strongly captures the central thesis of goal-setting the-
ory, a well-established theory of motivation in psychology
[55]. The idea is that the most effective performance seems
to result when goals are specific and challenging. Further,
psychological momentum in pursuing a set goal is difficult to
attenuate. Indeed, in Holy Grail performative settings where
entire social groups are pursuing the same specific goals, this
behavioral momentum is strengthened by social comparison
(as facilitated by leaderboards). When the goals also evolve to
become more difficult, this allows actors in the social group
to “level up”, yielding greater motivation. A side effect of
goal setting, however, may be a narrow focus that neglects
non-goal areas [70].
These behavioral factors are redolent of Kaiser andMoreno’s
claim that innovators cannot be expected to step outside the
momentum of their work to self-regulate. Developing AI
models within the common task framework has Holy Grail
performative social norms, much more so than, say, DNA
recombination where innovators had disparate functional
goals. As such, self-regulation is especially inadequate and
alternative governance approaches developed within the re-
sponsible innovation literature should be considered.
3 USERS AS FINE-TUNERS OF PRETRAINED
MODELS
As we have seen, the culture of AI model producers is very
much Holy Grail performative, pursuing innovation along a
dimension of merit like the GLUE score in Figure 1. In this
section, we turn to the social group of lead users, who are
concerned with functionally new applications of AI models
[92]. As Cowan has argued [19], analysis focused on users
allows for the possibility of unintended consequences, “with-
out which no sociological or historical explanation should
be taken seriously”. Yet, the responsible innovation litera-
ture has remained unconcerned with user-driven innovation,
cf. [86].
Within AI governance, too, the distinct role of innovative
users seems to be unconsidered, see e.g. a recent survey on
AI ethics frameworks that does not consider the social group
of users [28].
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Figure 2: In transferring a pretrained neural networkmodel
to a functionally new task, the early layers may be frozen as
is, and the last few layers retrained using new data for the
new task.
Users as AI Innovators
User innovation is of central importance in AI, where inno-
vative lead users of pretrained models fine-tune and transfer
them to functionally new applications, often far beyond what
producers may have imagined. Although we do not discuss
it further here, a closely related setting is multi-tenant cloud
provision of AI models where the model creator does not
have access to the data or application scenario for which the
customer is deploying the model.
Before proceeding, let us briefly describe the technological
approach used for transferring a neural network model de-
veloped for one task to work on a second task by fine-tuning.
In deep neural networks—taking feedforward networks such
as multilayer perceptrons or convolutional neural networks
as examples shown in Figure 2—it has been found that early
layers of models produce features that capture general at-
tributes of the training dataset whereas later layers of the
model capture properties of the task it is trained on. As such,
one approach for inductive transfer of a model for one task
(the pretrained model) to become a model for a different
task (the fine-tuned model) is to freeze the early layers from
the pretrained model and retrain the last couple layers us-
ing a new data set and a new task. This is computationally
much easier than training a new model from scratch: since
most learned parameters are taken straight from the pre-
trained model, a much smaller number of parameters must
be learned. In essence, this works by beneficially narrowing
the scope of possible models for the new task. The basic idea
is depicted in Figure 2, using the now-standard diagrammatic
style for neural network architectures.
Putting nuclear technology to new uses requires large,
expensive facilities and using recombinant DNA technology
requires specialized reagents, but fine-tuning and transfer of
AI models does not require either. Fine-tuning AI models is
feasible for a large social group of lead users. Even though
producers of pretrained models may have a particular mean-
ing in mind, they do not control how these artifacts are used
once in the hands of users. As noted in the social construc-
tion of technology literature, “users precisely as users can
embed new meanings into the technology” [42]. Indeed, it is
well-established in the user-driven innovation literature [92]
that lead users come up with numerous functionally new
applications.
In the early twentieth century, Ford had built the Model
T with the singular interpretation as a passenger vehicle,
but rural American users put it to use as a power source for
washing machines, butter churns, cream separators, corn
shellers, water pumps, hay balers, fodder and ensilage cut-
ters, wood saws, hay and grain hoists, cider presses, and
corn grinders, as well as in mobile form as a snowmobile,
tractor, and agricultural transport vehicle. This interpretive
flexibility of users later pushed Ford Motor Company itself to
create modification kits for the Model T [42]. Although per-
haps not quite as general-purpose technology as a car engine,
pretrained AI models have also been put to use in numerous
settings. Taking the example of the BERT language model
[21], it has been used for clinical medicine (clinicalBERT),
scientific research (SciBERT), story generation (TransBERT),
and intellectual property law (PatentBERT), among many
other language task settings just within a year of its release.
Besides these functionally new innovations that are pu-
tatively societally beneficial, lead users of AI models have
also reinterpreted them perniciously to innovate in societally
harmful ways. A typical example is DeepNude, an app that
removes clothing from the images of women, making them
look realistically nude [18] and is based on the previous
pix2pix image transfer model [34]. Katelyn Bowden, founder
and CEO of revenge porn activism organization Badass, was
quoted as saying “Now anyone could find themselves a vic-
tim of revenge porn, without ever having taken a nude photo.
This tech should not be available to the public” [18].
Users act as agents of technological change [71] not only in
changing the interpretation of artifacts as we have described,
but also in shaping the future design of artifacts themselves
[42]. The relationships among social groups both constrain
and enable the design and usage of technology, and the social
groups in turn get shaped in designing/using the technology.
The design and use of skateboards took place as community-
based innovation, with significant back-and-forth among pro-
ducers and users [81]. AI models are also developed largely
within a tightly knit community. Academically-inclined pro-
ducers and users publish papers in the same scholarly confer-
ences; individual innovators may be users during their train-
ing at universities and then become producers when they
join large companies (while also doing industrial internships
in between). Senior researchers may frequently move be-
tween universities and industry, even simultaneously having
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dual appointments in both [45]. Moreover, notwithstanding
Section 2, deep learning is largely an open source community
which further enables interactions among actors.
In general, pretrained models that perform better on their
benchmarks also perform better after fine-tuning on trans-
fer tasks [44, 58]. Yet, the strong interaction of users with
producers through community links has led to pretrained
models that are specifically designed to be better at induc-
tive transfer to other tasks [32, 61]. As a notable example,
consider SpanBERT (not a fine-tuning of BERT, but a new
pretrained model inspired by BERT) designed to be better at
inductive transfer to new language tasks [35]; its develop-
ers are primarily from Facebook but also have participants
from academia. The basic idea is to design the pretrained
model to better represent and predict spans of text, which
arise in several functionally novel language tasks; BERT was
concerned with individual words rather than spans of words.
As a variation, pretrained models can specifically be trained
for multiple tasks simultaneously [62], aiming to generalize
well to any task.
We have seen that the flexible interpretation and needs
of lead users of pretrained models both influence the design
of future pretrained models and lead to functionally new
innovations through fine-tuning.
Inadequacy of Producer-Focused Governance
Although producers and lead users are coupled within the
AI community, there is a division of labor between the two
social groups, which imply distinct considerations for AI
governance. As such, a focus solely on governance for pro-
ducers would neglect the network of social relations among
actors in the AI ecosystem, and the nature of accountability
propagating through the actor network [19, 27].
Pretrained models at the consumption junction, as Cowan
describes it [19], may be interpreted in both beneficent and
maleficent ways and therefore yield both putatively positive
and negative unintended consequences. Prima facie, benefi-
cence and non-maleficence are desirable, but these must be
balanced in AI governance, as embedded in the interaction
network of producers and users.
The case of pretrained AI models suggests that responsible
innovation should be expanded to include the role of users.
4 PRETRAINED MODELS AS (IM)MUTABLE
MOBILES
We have seen in the previous section that users interpret
pretrained AI models in various ways, and transfer them
to numerous functionally new uses through fine-tuning. In
this section, we look more at how the models themselves
move through the relevant social groups and how an un-
derstanding of such information spreading may inform AI
governance. A recent survey indicates that the spreading dy-
namics, fine-tuning, and recombination of AI models do not
enter into existing AI governance frameworks [28], which
instead focus only on initial development and release.
Just as in Section 3, this omission suggests the value in
expanding the scope of responsible AI innovation from a
static focus on release to considering network dynamics.
Pretrained Models in Action
Pretrained models are mathematical objects that specify par-
ticular neural network architectures and learned synaptic
weights: they are functional and can be used directly to per-
form inference when deployed as AI services or as part of
larger AI services in sociotechnical systems, cf. [3, 90]. Al-
though they are formalisms, they are not abstractions (under
common definitions), but the thing itself. Abstractions such
as neural network architecture diagrams of the type in Fig-
ure 2 also move around—with Latourian optical consistency
[47]—among actors in the AI social network, but we focus
on the pretrained AI models themselves.4
Pretrained models move around with not just optical con-
sistency, but mathematically precise identicality. Indeed, the
raison d’être of pretrainingmodels is to move with no change,
due to the computational cost in training large AI models. In
this sense, they are computationally immutable mobiles; yet,
as we saw in Section 3, they are interpretively flexible. They
are essentially physically immutable like car engines, which
are difficult to modify without specialized equipment, rather
than mutable like paper tools that are inherently plastic [36].
Although there are local, personal instructional interac-
tions (including academic training relationships) among ac-
tors in AI, the primary way pretrained models are dissemi-
nated is through postings to open source repositories such
as GitHub, see e.g. Figure 3. Insights into design ideas and de-
tailed performance characterization are disseminated through
preprint servers such as arXiv, together with more infor-
mal explanations as blog posts, which may further spread
through social media such as Twitter. In such a technology-
mediated open source community [9], models circulatewidely
from their original point of dispersion. One can see more
than 4000 forks of the BERT model in Figure 3 by a wide
variety of users, to say nothing of downloads that were then
fine-tuned.
Despite limited institutional gate keepers in open source
settings (like journal editors, as in some branches of science),
cultural norms do lead to a kind of file drawer problem [26]
where only effective (with respect to producers’ benchmarks)
models and approaches are put into circulation by producers.
4Neural network architecture search and hyperparameter tuning is even
more computationally intensive than training single neural networks [87]
and so architecture diagrams may take a similar sociological position as
pretrained models.
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Figure 3: Google Research’s BERT GitHub repository, which
allows anonymous download of the pretrainedmodel, train-
ing code, and documentation, as well as forking and other
version management operations (19 Aug. 2019).
Ineffective ideas only spread by local instructional interac-
tion through personal contact.
In addition to models, datasets, and code spreading, there
have been several suggestions to create model cards for pre-
trained models [66] or fact sheets for larger compositions of
models as AI services [3] that move along with them. Like
nutrition labels for food or parts sheets for electronics, they
are meant to be documentation listing performance charac-
terization, contexts for intended usage, as well as properties
such as safety (including fairness/explainability), security,
and provenance. By listing contexts for intended usage, such
documentation is meant to avoid the portability trap arising
from abstraction [80], as pretrained models move around. As
far as we know, such documentation approaches have not
been put into widescale practice.
Although Mitchell et al. [66] suggest model cards may
inform users on “different options for fine-tuning, model
combination,” such documentation does not capture how per-
formance, appropriateness, or safety properties may change
under fine-tuning and transfer to other tasks, even though
this is a primary mode of use. Moreover, model cards or fact
sheets do not include an expiration date for validity in an
ever-changing world.
Arnold et al. [3] argue that “systems composed of safe com-
ponents may be unsafe and, conversely, it may be possible to
build safe systems out of unsafe components,” and therefore
focus on specific larger AI services composed of AI models.
The danger of compositions may be especially pernicious
when AI models are sociotechnically coupled in complex and
tight ways [72]. Fact sheets do not consider recombinations
of models or novel combinations of models. Indeed, there
is as yet, no compositional calculus for the properties of AI
models, like there is in cryptography [53]; unlike other part
sheets [14], proposed AI documentation does not even indi-
cate how to put pieces from a library together to build more
complicated AI services (in sociotechnical systems [90]).
To summarize, AI models are computationally immutable
but interpretively flexible. They become dissociated from
context as they move around—despite attempts to counter
this using detailed documentation. This is especially the
case since dissemination is largely technology-mediated and
disconnected from personal interactions.
Inadequacy of Static Governance
Once AI models are developed, they move around. Indeed,
much of the action is in this spreading and reinterpretation.
Since there is a decentralized, technology-mediated network
of dissemination and change, there are no Latourian “centers
of calculation” that maintain their scientific prominence and
authority by having people continually return to them from
hinterlands. Prominence within the common task framework
may come directly from good performance on specifically
stated criteria (achieving which often requires significant re-
sources). As such, AI governance that only considers existing
centers of production and their initial act of dissemination
will be inadequate.
Moreover, the fine-tuning and combining of AImodels that
happens as they move is not mere bricolage, but is governed
by the interpretive flexibility that users have for AI models.
An understanding of the changing and combining dynamics
of AI models is essential to effective AI governance.
The case of pretrained AI models suggests that responsible
innovation should be expanded to consider the mechanisms
and dynamics of spreading throughout the actor network.
5 BARNESIAN PERFORMATIVITY OF UNFAIR
PRETRAINED MODELS
As AI models move through actor networks, become reinter-
preted, and are fine-tuned to transfer to contexts previously
unimagined, they remain computationally immutable. One
particular property of pretrained AI models and services that
model cards and fact sheets aim to capture is fairness, which
necessarily also remains computationally fixed.
When fine-tuned or composed into larger AI services,
pretrained models are often interpreted as abstract black
boxes of intelligence dissociated from context, much like
grain is abstracted when put into a grain elevator, dissociated
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from its source [20], or gamete cells are abstracted as reagents
when carrying out long-term freezing, dissociated from space
and time [46]. For example, in describing PatentBERT, Lee
and Hsiang [51] only say:
In this work, we leverage the released BERT-
Base pre-trained model (Uncased: 12-layer,
768- hidden, 12-heads, 110M parameters)
. . .Our implementation follows the fine-
tuning example released in the BERT project
. . .We intentionally keep the code change
as minimal as possible
and never discuss any further properties of the BERT model
or the dataset it was trained on.
Cast as black boxes, the internal properties of pretrained
models are not of central interest to many lead users. Even
if there were model cards that specifically call out properties
such as fairness and these are brought to the attention of
users, these characterizations may fall into a formalism trap
of abstraction, since summary statistics would not capture
e.g. contextual or contestable aspects of fairness [80].
Yet, there is (appropriately defined) unfairness along many
socially observable dimensions embedded within pretrained
models [60]. Despite no animus—only apathy—on the part of
actors in the community, this implies unfairness in pretrained
models can spread widely. Moreover, unfairness in AI models
can actually exacerbate unfairness in society itself through a
kind of Barnesian performativity, as we describe next. Recall
that Barnesian performativity is the effect that using a model
in practice makes a societal process more like its depiction
by that model [57]. Controlling such feedback may require a
feedback-based strategy.
Indeed, these kinds of unfairness dynamics for the case
of AI suggest the need to expand responsible innovation to
consider feedback-based governance.
Amplifying Bias in Pretrained Models
Algorithmic unfairness may be immutably embedded in pre-
trained models, and further this unfairness may not be ev-
ident to users as they often abstract pretrained models as
black boxes [80], dissociated and decontextualized from the
training data used to develop them. When users fine-tune
pretrained models to transfer for alternative tasks, recent
empirical analyses suggest that they may in fact amplify
biases in the original model [97]. From a societal perspective,
this is similar to adverse drug events from off-label prescrib-
ing of drugs [24], where side effects may be amplified when
transferring a drug to a clinical setting for which it was not
initially developed or tested.
Of greater concern, however, is that societies can perform
models, exacerbating the societal bias that was originally
present in the training data. AI models do not stand out-
side of society; rather they are part of the infrastructure of
modern society [41]. Therefore AI algorithms do not just
passively capture the properties of society, but in fact shape
their evolution as intrinsic parts of societal processes.
As noted by MacKenzie in his study of financial models
and markets [57], “the sociologist Barry Barnes has empha-
sized the central role in social life of self-validating feedback
loops.” As such, he refers to the form of performativity where
the use of a model make the model “more true” as Barnesian,
a term we also adopt. We observe that the use of a biased AI
model makes a difference and may significantly alter society
to conform more to the model, a self-fulfilling prophecy [64].
The basic mechanisms by which a biased AI model can
be Barnesian performative is well-understood in economic
theories of discrimination [4, 17, 43, 84]. Let us describe the
two primary dynamic mechanisms in the context of human
resource management, where AI models have been used
for many years, e.g. [63]. First, a worker in a disadvantaged
groupmay fail to invest in her human capital if she knows the
employer’s AI model is unlikely to suggest she be promoted.
Second, an employer itself may invest less (e.g. for training)
in a worker from a disadvantaged group if an AI model
indicates that the worker will not benefit. This leads to a self-
fulfilling prophecy when new training data is used to update
models that capture this under investment by disadvantaged
subpopulations.
In the AI context, recent mathematical models of AI model
retraining [33, 67] capture this dynamic phenomenon of pop-
ulations becoming more like what (biased) models predict, a
kind of positive feedback.
Inadequacy of Dead-Reckoned Governance
In control theory, there are two main approaches: feedfor-
ward and feedback. Under feedforward control, a system
responds to a control signal in a predefined way, whereas
under feedback control, the system adjusts the control signal
based on how the plant reacts. In navigation, feedforward
is called dead reckoning and requires advanced calculation
of the exact direction, magnitude, and timing of all actions.
This is nearly impossible to implement for complex systems
whose dynamics are uncertain.
As we argued, the unfairness of pretrained models may
amplify as time progresses and as they are transferred to
other tasks—a kind of positive feedback. Given these com-
plex dynamics, AI governance may take inspiration from
control theory, which suggests the use of feedback control
either alone or in combination with feedforward control. In
particular, positive feedback can be reduced by feedforward
damping supplemented by adding negative feedback.
Pretrained AI Models: Performativity, Mobility, and Change
In law and economics, both regulation and litigation are
used to mitigate market failures; one dimension of distinc-
tion is that regulation is ex ante whereas litigation is ex post.
Strong ex ante approaches are often inspired by the precau-
tionary principle [78]. In many ways, ex ante governance
is analogous to feedforward control whereas ex post gover-
nance is analogous to feedback control. Note that regulatory
approaches can be ex post; for example the Food and Drug
Administration performs postmarket surveillance of drug
safety and issues recall notices when a drug is found unsafe.
When considering unintentional ethical issues such as
algorithmic unfairness rather than intentional malicious use
by users as in previous sections, we still find that responsible
innovation should be expanded with a network-centric view-
point and further allow the possibility of ex post governance
based on feedback, rather than just ex ante governance.
6 RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION IN AI
Discourse in science and technology ethics, and responsible
innovation in particular, have put forth general principles
and frameworks for thinking about technology governance.
Stilgoe et al. [86] suggest that “responsible innovation means
taking care of the future through collective stewardship of
science and innovation in the present.” This essentially in-
volves asking what kind of future is desired and then asking
what kinds of actions should be taken, given there is much
uncertainty about the future. In this approach, ethical gover-
nance moves from consequentialism to a question of process.
Thus far, insights from the responsible innovation liter-
ature have played a limited role in AI practice [10, 12]. As
noted by von Schomberg, definitions in technology gover-
nance are usually initially made by using analogies, which
serve to normalize the new technology. As understanding
of the technology grows, the force of analogies weakens
and distinct governance responses can be made [93]. Here,
making analogies between AI and other potentially dual-use
technologies such as nuclear and DNA recombination have
allowed us to understand the inadequacy of self-regulation.
Moreover, we will see the analogy also suggests an alter-
native governance approach. Distinct approaches, however,
may be needed to address the inadequacies of producer-
focused, static, and dead-reckoned governance that we have
identified through an STS (and especially SCOT)-based anal-
ysis of how pretrained models move and change through
the actions of distinct social groups. The case of AI suggests
that to pursue care for the future, responsible innovation
must expand to consider dynamics, feedback, and networks
of users.
Drawing on the insight that consequentialist governance
premised on formal risk assessment has done little to predict
many of the most profound impacts of innovation [86], we
take a more expansive viewpoint. Focusing on process to
expand beyond current AI governance approaches (without
taking a strong normative stand), we suggest the follow-
ing possibilities to address the inadequacies discussed in
the previous sections. In doing so, we specifically recognize
that the social world acts to fundamentally shape technical
development at every level.
Self-Governance As detailed in the responsible innova-
tion literature [86, 93], contrary to self-governance by in-
novators, an alternative is deliberative and inclusive gov-
ernance with broad stakeholder involvement. This aims to
diversify the inputs to and the delivery of governance [13].
A process of inclusion forces consideration of questions of
power. One goal is to achieve a consensus set of norms and
governance processes that are based on a broad set of values,
standardized across the AI community. In fact, the Partner-
ship on AI has been pursuing exactly this goal [52], though
this effort may be enhanced by greater understanding of
Holy Grail performativity.
Producer-Focused Governance We have argued that
innovation by lead users into functionally new application
areas is a key process in AI, outside the control of pretrained
model producers. Extant discussions of AI governance, how-
ever, have focused only on producers. An alternative is an
ethics of co-responsibility, where producers and lead users
assume shared responsibility [27] for intended and unin-
tended consequences, rather than producers being cast as
a kind of moral crumple zone [25]. Such a network-centric
view recognizes the fact that lead users are agents embed-
ded in a network of social relations that limits and controls
the technological choices they are capable of making [19].
More specifically, mechanisms such as codes of conduct and
ethical technology review conversations may build greater
reflexivity in both users and producers.
Static Governance Since pretrained models are interpre-
tively flexible as they move, a static view of governance does
not capture the dynamics of change and recombination as
the models are put to numerous innovative uses. Moreover, a
risk-based assessment does not capture the desire to balance
the beneficence and non-maleficence of users. An alternative
possibility is governance built on a compositional calculus
for pretrained models, paired with anticipation through tech-
nology foresight that specifically considers their mobility
and change. Note that the responsible innovation literature
has developed structured ways of performing technology
foresight [39], but grounding in the (im)mutability of pre-
trained models would only enhance this process.
Dead-Reckoned GovernanceWhereas fixing an ex ante
governance approach for anticipated malicious uses may
be prudent, it also seems incomplete in the face of com-
plex sociotechnical systems involving AI. Recognizing that
most innovations are unexpected and hard to forecast (es-
pecially functionally new applications) suggests the need
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for ex post surveillance too, much like ongoing monitor-
ing of drug safety. Such a feedback-based approach is re-
sponsive to the power of innovative technology to create
the future. For fairness specifically, there are even batteries
of statistical tests that could be administered as pretrained
models move into new applications [8, 43], but their deploy-
ment may be improved by greater understanding of the self-
fulfilling prophecy of Barnesian performativity. Moreover
such feedback-based governance enable social learning.
7 CONCLUSION
Our estimates suggest that the cost to train (not considering
architecture search or hyperparameter tuning) XLNet was
$50,000, to train RoBERTa was $60,000, and to train GPT-2
was $250,000. On the other hand, the cost to fine-tune BERT
on the SQuAD dataset is estimated to cost only $3. That is,
it is at least tens of thousands of times more costly to ini-
tially develop a pretrained model than to fine-tune it. This
technological distinction has several social consequences.
We have described here, how large-scale AI models are de-
veloped, how they are used, how they move around among
agents, and what unfairness properties may be embedded
and exacerbated in them as they move.
When closed stoves were developed in the eighteenth cen-
tury, there were various interpretations about their safety.
Their predecessor technology, open hearths, were also dan-
gerous but their “dangerswere dangers that people had coped
with for centuries; the risks of stoves were new and thus
potentially more worrisome” [19]. Such worry (now for AI)
often yields a desire for governance, but emerging technolo-
gies typically fall into an institutional void, where there are
few agreed upon governance structures [29] and analogies
to old technologies may be inadequate. Here we have ar-
gued that analyzing the sociological position of pretrained
AI models suggests expanding responsible innovation to sev-
eral new factors that may yield more responsive and effective
AI governance.
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